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Abstract— The paper emphasized on examining the role of 
international actors in resolving the Somalia conflict and 
the peace processes since 1991. The paper employed 
qualitative research approach. It used secondary source of 
data such as books, journal articles, and conference papers. 
There was an exhaustive civil war in Somalia since 1991. 
There were several reasons for the raising of the conflict. 
Still, Somalia is politically instable country. Consequently, 
the international actors involved to settle the conflict. The 
United Nations, African Union, Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development, United States of America, and 
Ethiopia tried to resolve the conflict and establish stable 
Somalia state. There were different peace agreements to 
settle the conflict. However, the peace agreement did not 
achieve the expected goals. Now a day, Somalia has its own 
central government but the government is not strong 
enough to administer the territory effectively. As a result, 
the security problems of Horn of Africa are arising from 
Somalia. 
Keywords— International Actors, Role, Somalia, Conflict, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Following the collapse of the President Siad Barre 
government in 1991, the Somali conflict has become 
complex. There were a conflict for controlling political and 
economic power and also conflict based on clan and so on. 
For instance, the Darood clan, to which Siad Barre 
belonged, was hated by the other clans because there are 
assumed as benefited from widespread corruption fuelled by 
a large influx of foreign aid and by the country’s resources. 
This situation intensifies the conflict (Roba & Berouk, 
2011).  
The cause of the Somalia civil war was so complex. The 
conflict might be grounded in political factors, economic 
factors, the colonial legacy, and the availability of weapons 
and so on. The first cause for Somalia conflict is the intense 
competition for power and resource. For instance, the civil 
war with in the Hawiye, the Darod, the Digil, and Mirifle, 
and the Issaq clans was a resource and/or power motivated 
conflict (Hammod & Lindely, 2014). In addition, the Abgal 
and the Habargidir clans had never fought throughout their 
history and in fact belong to the same clan (Hawiye) and 
sub-clan (Hiraab). However, when Mogadishu fell to the 
United Somali Congress (USC) (to which they both 
belonged) a power struggle broke out between General 
Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed which 
affects most part of Somalia (ibid). 
The second cause was the colonial legacy when the Somalia 
was divided among the British, Italy, and French colonial 
powers. This led for the polarization of Somalia and for the 
question of restoring the territories which are under other 
sovereign states after its independence, for instance, Ogaden 
in Ethiopia (Lewis, 2008). The partitioning of Somalia 
permanently damage affect the Somali people. The effect of 
the partition continues to haunt the Somali people since the 
two Somali territories remain under the control of Ethiopia 
and Kenya (Hammod & Lindely, 2014).  
Thirdly, the Clan System is a most important and 
fundamental factor in the Somali conflict. although Somalia 
is a homogeneous state, clans and sub-clans play a very 
important role in defining the political, economic and social 
landscape of Somalia. Over 80 percent of the Somali people 
are pastoralists who are lacking the culture of a centralized 
administrative system and promoting loyalty to their kin 
and clans (Zartman, 1995). The division between clans has 
also widened over the years due to competition over 
resources, elite manipulation, and political patronage. For 
instance, during twenty years in power (1969–1991), Siad 
Barre introduced a clan based divide and rule policy. Barre 
developed his own mechanism of appointing loyal political 
agents from his own clan to guide and control civil and 
military institutions. Barre’s policy instigated suspicion and 
hatred among the clans and finally led the country into deep 
civil war and statelessness (ibid).  
The war lords and the Islamic fundamentalist groups had 
emerged in Somalia and led the state to the continuous 
crisis. Surprisingly, in 2006, the Union of Islamic Court 
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(UIC) came to take power in Mogadishu and rapidly 
expanded to the south and central parts of Somalia (ibid). 
Many formal and informal apparatuses have been used to 
settle the crisis in Somalia. For instance, in the formal way 
the peace processes such as the Addis Ababa Conference in 
1993, the Arta peace process in 2000, the Eldorate Process 
in 2004, which gave birth to the first Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG I) in 2004;  the Djibouti Peace Process in 
2008 which brought TFG II, and so on were taken (Dagne, 
2009). 
Moreover, because of the severe crisis in Somalia different 
international actors had engaged to stabilize the state. In 
1992, the United Nations (UN) created a peacekeeping 
force called United Nations Operations on Somalia 
(UNOSOM) to restore order in the capital, Mogadishu, and 
safeguard relief supplies. The United States contributed to 
the effort with a force called UNITAF. UNITAF withdrew 
in 1994, and UNOSOM followed suit in 1995 (Duke 
University, 2007). In addition, Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) took an initiative to 
bring peace in Somalia and similarly, Africa Union also 
took responses. The objective of the paper is analyzing the 
conflict in Somalia since 1991 and the efforts to resolve the 
civil war. 
 
II. THE NATURE OF THE SOMALIA 
CONFLICT 
2.1. The Rise of Warlords in Somalia in 1990s 
Following the 1977/1978 war between Somalia and 
Ethiopia, the military officers tried to coup against the Saide 
Barre government since elites from specific clans controlled 
the state power, and the economy. But after the aborted 
coup the Saide Barre government used an excessive force 
against the Majerteen clan which most of the officers 
belonged. This event was the beginning for the rising of 
warlords and the Somalia’s civil war. Other clans such as 
the Isaaq, Ogaden, Hawiye and Digil and Mirifle also 
started fighting in order to seize power (Elmi & Barisse, 
2006). 
Therefore, the post-Barre regime was recognized by a 
prolonged period of violent anarchy and warfare. The most 
intense period of conflict was during 1991-1992 when the 
different clan factions from the old regime and the newly 
emerged opposition militias fought for controlling of land 
and resources in the south of the country (Lewis, 2008). The 
armed conflict raged across southern Somalia through 1991 
and 1992, fighting clan-based militias against another for 
control of valuable towns, seaports, and neighborhoods. The 
wars, which began as struggle for control of the 
government, quickly degenerated into predatory looting, 
banditry, and occupation of valuable real estate by 
conquering clan militias. Young gunmen fought principally 
to secure war booty, and were under only the loosest control 
of militia commanders (ibid). The principal victims of this 
violence were weak agricultural communities and coastal 
minority groups caught in the middle of the fighting 
(Bradbury and Healy, 2010). 
There was an intense fight between United Somali Congress 
(USC) leadership though it was predominately from the 
Hawiye tribe. The struggle was between the self-appointed 
president Ali Mahdi Mohammed and General Mohamed 
Farah Aideed. For a year the power struggle afflicted the 
Somali people with loss of lives and property. The two 
men’s quarrel became everyone’s problem. Too often, this 
is the case in modern-day Somalia (Mohamed, 2009). In 
1990s, strong armed movements which struggle for political 
and economic power had been emerged in Somalia. Among 
them were: the United Somali Congress, USC (Hawiye 
clan), the Somali Patriotic Movement (Ogadeni clan), and 
the Somali Salvation Democratic Movement (Majerten 
clan) (Bradbury and Healy, 2010). 
2.2. The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism in Somalia 
The historical tendency of armed factions in the country to 
align themselves with the global agenda for both ideological 
and strategic purposes has shaped what on the surface could 
be framed a new insurgency. Since 9/11 this has tended to 
be considered as terrorism (Roba & Berouk, 2011). In 2004-
2006, the UIC was able to control larger territories in the 
south and central parts of Somalia including Mogadishu and 
established a resemblance of peace in the areas of their 
control. On December 24, 2006, Ethiopian and TFG forces 
launched a successful military attack against the UIC. In 
less than a week, the Ethiopian troops captured Mogadishu 
and the UIC dissolved and surrendered political leadership 
to clan leaders (ICJ cited in Kidist, 2009). Later, Al-
Shabaab, the military wing of the UIC, started launching 
attacks against the TFG and Ethiopian forces and also the 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (ibid). 
 
III. THE INFORMAL AND FORMAL 
APPARATUSES TO RESOLVE THE 
SOMALIA CONFLICT: POST-1991 
3.1. The Informal Mechanisms 
Though the informal institutions were almost not 
successful, they had exerted many efforts in order to solve 
the Somalia crisis. Among the informal institutions: 
3.1.1. The Elders 
Traditional elders are an important source to bring 
reconciliation. In Somalia, following the crisis, many elders 
have participated in calming the civil war. For instance in 
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2004, they have involved in the selection of members of 
parliament so as to influence faction leaders and investing 
the process with greater legitimacy in the eyes of the Somali 
public. Whatever the case, the elders were not effective in 
bringing solutions particularly in much of southern Somalia 
because it was difficult for them to counter the financial and 
military power of faction leaders or their private sector 
backers (International Crisis Group, 2004). 
The elders’ reconciliation process was complicated because 
many elders have been considered as corrupted, co-opted 
for political purposes or have otherwise blighted the 
prestige of their office. In such cases, they may no longer 
represent credible alternatives to faction leaders and their 
partisans (ibid). 
3.1.2. The Civil Society 
The civil societies such as NGOs, women's groups, 
professional associations, academics, and former politicians 
are other informal institutions which strived to bring peace 
in Somalia. These civil societies were participating in 
providing social services but they were not free from the 
influence of clan and factionalism. In other side though civil 
society representatives have been present at the talks, it is 
not always clear whose interest they represent except their 
own (International Crisis Group, 2004). 
3.1.3. The business sectors 
Business sectors have also tried to contribute in bringing 
peace in Somalia. They were endeavoring to eliminate the 
war economy of Somalia i.e., avoiding the trading of war 
weapons in Somalia. As a result, many business sectors 
have begun to participate in civic activities. For example, 
they were contributing to civic action initiatives such as the 
Somali Leadership Foundation, which was launched in 
2003 to support and reward Somalis who have made 
important contributions to promoting peace, dialogue and 
the principles of human rights (International Crisis Group, 
2004). 
3.2. The Formal Mechanisms 
Formally, various peace processes were delivered to solve 
the Somalia civil war with the help of different States, 
regional and international organizations. Among the major 
ones: 
3.2.1. The 1993 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement 
The 1993 Addis Ababa Agreement on national 
reconciliation was arranged by UN (Bradbury, 1994; 
Makhubela, 2012). The signatories at the conference were 
the fifteen political faction leaders, who were the warlords 
that had been responsible for much of the suffering in 
Somalia and regarded as criminals by many Somalis. The 
war lords were invited to the conference as the UNITAF 
needed to protect its own forces in Somalia. The UN invited 
to 250 intellectuals, clan elders, religious leaders, women 
and artists to participate in conference (ibid). 
The Addis Ababa Agreement reaffirmed the 1993 
agreement on cease-fire and disarmament and reached an 
agreement on the formation of transitional mechanisms for 
the restoration of political and administrative structures. In 
particular, it agreed upon the formation of: Transitional 
National Council (TNC), Regional Councils in eighteen 
regions of the country, Central Administrative Departments 
to re-establish civil administration etc. (Moller, 2009; 
Makhubela, 2012). 
3.2.2. The 1993 Boroma Peace process 
The Boroma peace agreement on national reconciliation 
provided a solid foundation for the enrichment of the 
Somaliland secession from the Somali republic (Brabury, 
1994; Makhubela, 2012). The Boroma agreement produced 
a peace charter to strengthen security and regularize the role 
of the traditional local elders in all aspects surrounding 
peacemaking (Lewis, 2002; Makhubela, 2012). The Addis 
Ababa, Arta and Mgagathi peace processes did not make a 
provision for the structural representation of the clan elders 
regarding decision making during the peace conferences. 
3.2.3. The 2000 Arta Peace Process 
In some extent the Arta peace process was influenced by the 
Addis Ababa peace agreement such as establishing some 
form of government system (Moore, 2003; Makhubela, 
2012). 
The Arta peace process was an initiative of the president of 
Djibouti Ismail Omar Guelle in order to establish the 
Transitional National Government (TNC). IGAD was the 
under writer of the process though the Ethiopia government 
worked actively to undermine the outcome of the process 
due to the perception that Islamists such as Al-Ittihad 
dominated outcomes (Tadesse, 2002; Makhubela, 2012). 
In the Arta peace process about 2000 delegates were 
attended in the peace process and motivated to create a 
building of a system of government. As a result, 44 seats 
were setup and allocated to the main clans that are the 
Hawiye, Darod, Digil, Mirfile, and Dir clans (Adar, 2001; 
Makhubela, 2012). Nevertheless, the TNG did not get a 
support from the Mogadishu citizens (Lewis, 2008). 
3.2.4. The 2004 Mbagathi peace process 
The 2004 Mbagathi peace process was initiated by IGAD in 
2002. It was the time that the TNG had failed and the 
Mogadishu warlords were becoming a dominant force 
threatening the national security of Kenya and Ethiopia. 
Thus, the agreement was founded on the basis that creating 
state institutions will transform the Somalia conflict (Lewis, 
2008; Makhubela, 2012). The European Union (EU) and the 
UN were become again the financial sponsors of the peace 
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process which first took place in the Kenyan town of 
Eldorent (Menkhaus, 2003; Makhubela, 2012). The 
Mbagathe peace process established the transitional federal 
government and Abdulahi Yussuf Ahmed became a 
president. Nevertheless, the government was not effective in 
controlling the territory (Adam, 2008). 
3.2.5. The 2008 Djibouti peace Process 
In case of the ineffectiveness and the controversies of TFG 
I, TFG II established through the Djibouti peace process in 
2008. In this peace process it was promised that to 
strengthen the coalition of moderates from the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG I) and opposition groups 
including many Islamists who signed the Djibouti Peace 
Agreement in 2008 (Menkhaus, 2009). 
 
IV. THE RESPONSES OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 
Due to the severe civil war in Somalia and its effect on the 
regional and international peace and security, various 
international actors have provided different responses to 
calm the situation. So, the paper discussed on few of 
international actors and their responses. 
 
4.1. The United Nations Intervention 
 For the first time, the U.N. was involved in peace 
enforcement that is the armed intervention into a conflict 
without the prior consent of the state authorities involved in 
the hostilities. The combination of civil war and 
humanitarian crises after the state collapsed in 1991, led to 
the first UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). It was 
authorized by Security Council Resolution 751 of April 24, 
1992 (Dagne, 2009; UN, 2014). The UN intervention in 
Somalia was initially prompted by a desire on the part of the 
international community to protect food relief, disease and 
end the famine ravaging southern Somalia. It was initially 
involving nearly 30,000 troops (Haldén, 2008). 
Due to the intensification of the conflict in Somalia, UN 
Security Council authorized a US-led Unified Task Force 
(UNITAF) to take the security measures. Eventually, 
UNITAF’s mandate was expanded under UNOSOM II in 
May 1993 to assist Somalis in promoting national 
reconciliation, rebuilding the central government, and 
reviving the economy (Kidist, 2009; UN, 2014). After UN’s 
withdrew in 1995, it has been providing financial, logistical, 
and technical assistance to the AMISOM through the UN 
Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) to calm the 
situation in Somalia (ibid). 
4.2. The African Union Response 
In September 2006, the AU decided to send a peacekeeping 
mission to Somalia and African Union Mission for Somalia 
(AMISOM) was deployed in 2007. The mission was to 
provide a support to the TFG I in order to stabilize the 
situations in Somalia and the furtherance of dialogue and 
reconciliation; to facilitate the provision of humanitarian 
assistance and for reconstruction and development in 
Somalia. It is a peacekeeping mission operated by the AU 
with the approval of the United Nations under Resolution 
1744 (Berouk & Roba, 2011). 
AMISOM only deploys troops from Uganda and Burundi, 
and until 2010 had a combined force of 5250 in Mogadishu. 
Since its deployment, AMISOM has managed at least to 
protect the Abdullahi Yusuf and later the Sheikh Sharif 
administrations (ibid). 
4.3. Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) Response 
IGAD has been contributing in preparing a forum for the 
peace agreements in 
 order to solve the Somalia civil war. For instance, IGAD 
initiated the 2004 Mbagathi peace process to establish the 
Transitional Federal Government I (TFG I) of Somalia. It 
also played a great role for the establishment of the 
Transitional Federal Government II (TFG II) in 2008 
(Kidist, 2009). 
In addition, due to the intensification of the insurgency, 
IGAD showed its support for the TFG as a legitimate 
government in Somalia and to be assisted by the other 
international community.  Thus, it pushed for the 
deployment of the African Peacekeeping Mission in 
Somalia, which was deployed in March 2007(Miti, 2010). 
IGAD also established a Somalia Facilitator Liaison Office 
in Addis Ababa in 2008. The Facilitator’s Office is 
mandated to: facilitate reconciliation, assist institutional and 
capacity building efforts, and assist the mobilization of 
financial and technical resources for the TFG II (ibid). 
4.4. The United States Response 
The US has cooperated with the UN mission to protect the 
Somali from the existing miserable situations. The US 
initiated the Operation Restore Hope to Somalia and 
expanded it with cooperation of United Nations in the early 
1990s. But due to the 1993 attack against the US and UN 
forces, the US left out Somalia (Roba & Berouk, 2007). 
Again, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US has been 
focusing on Somalia as long as Somalia becomes a safe 
haven place for the terrorist groups and Islamic 
fundamentalists (ibid). The United States, in response to 
what they saw as an Islamic fundamentalist threat, formed 
the Alliance for Restoration for Peace and Counter-Terror 
in Februrary 2006 (Menkhaus cited in Duke University, 
2007; Miti, 2010). 
International Journal of English, Literature and Social Science (IJELS)                                                     Vol-2, Issue-1, Jan-Feb- 2017 
ISSN: 2456-7620 
www.ijels.com                                                                                                                                                                                        Page | 16 
The current involvement of the US in Somalia due to the 
believe that Somalia has been becoming a safe haven for al-
Qaeda related groups. In this regard, the US launched 
attacks in different times. For instance, in January 2007 US 
launched attack in southern Somalia and killed Al Fazul 
Abdullah Mohammed, who is believed to have been one the 
master minds of the Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam bombings 
in 1998 (Roba & Berouk, 2007; Miti, 2010). 
4.5. The Response of Ethiopia 
Ethiopia has provided different responses for the crisis of 
Somalia. For instance, Ethiopia supported the establishment 
of Transitional Federal Government in 2004 (TFG I) and 
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG II) in 2008 
(Lewis, 2008; Miti, 2010). Following the emergence of 
fundamentalist groups such as Union of Islamic Court 
(UIC), in 2006, the Ethiopian forces launched a military 
attack against the UIC. In few days, the Ethiopian troops 
captured Mogadishu and the UIC dissolved and surrendered 
political leadership to clan leaders. But still, the Al-Shabaab 
that is the military wing of the UIC has been attacking 
against the TFG and other neighboring countries (ICJ cited 
in Kidist, 2009; Miti, 2010). 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, though Somalia people are homogeneous, 
since the early 1990s Somalia has been in severe civil war 
based on the clan and sub-clan level. In the civil war, 
several Somalia peoples had become victims. There were 
various causes for the emergence of the Somalia civil war 
such as clannism, the competition for resource and power, 
colonial legacy, underdevelopment, availability of weapons 
etc. These and other factors played a great role for the rising 
of the severe crisis in Somalia. 
Many international actors such as United Nations, African 
Union, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, 
United States of America and Ethiopia tried to settle the 
Somalia conflict. For example, United Nations engaged in 
Somalia to provide humanitarian support and to bring peace 
and stability. The informal and formal mechanisms have 
been delivered to solve the Somalia crisis. For instance, in 
the formal ways various peace processes such as the 1993 
Addis Ababa peace agreement; the 1993 Boroma Peace 
process; the 2000 Arta peace process; and the 2004 
Mbagathi peace process; and the 2008 Djibouti peace 
process were made. However, the peace agreements did not 
achieve the expected goals.  
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